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1 Introduction
In economics, the allocation of resources is often rationalized by games with conflicting
interests. This is particularly true in legislatures, where politicians compete to win more
money for their districts. To study these situations, non-cooperative legislative bargain-
ing games have often been used. However, there is greater room for cooperation and
compromise in certain types of bills. For distributive legislation, near unanimous con-
sent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. Weingast (1994) defines an ideal
type of distributive legislation as an expenditure policy which is an omnibus of divisible
projects. For instance, there were 62 distributive bills on capital projects passed in the
Pennsylvania State Legislature from 1981 to 2014 following this definition. 85.5 percent
and 62.9 percent of these bills received unanimous support in the Senate and the House
respectively. For the bills that did not receive unanimous agreement, average support
rate was 93.6 percent in the Senate and 92.4 percent in the House. Universal cooperation
over broad allocation of benefits is also commonly found in other contexts. Previous liter-
ature finds evidence that various distributive legislations on rivers and harbors, military
procurement, categorical grants-in-aid, and public works have passed with unanimous
support.2
This phenomenon is commonly referred to as “universalism.” The two main questions
that I address in this paper are the following. First, what determines allocation of money
across local public projects under universalism? Second, do political factors affect the
allocations and, if so, to what extent? I study both theoretically and empirically how a
legislature allocates a budget to fund local public projects in an omnibus bill, one in which
many small appropriations are packaged into a large bill. I develop a game-theoretic model
2See Weingast (1979) and Shepsle & Weingast (1981) for an overview.
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where allocations which are strategically determined to sustain unanimous support arise
as the unique equilibrium outcome. Previously, Shepsle and Weingast (1981) studied why
universalism emerges. The idea is that under majority rule, politicians face uncertainty
over the composition of winning coalition and this can induce ex-ante preferences for
universalism. The theoretical innovation of this paper is that I explain what determines
allocations under universalism by combining the insight of Shepsle and Weingast (1981)
with the insight of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) in the non-cooperative bargaining game. To
my best knowledge, given a budget and a legislative protocol, how politicians cooperate
yet strategically interact to allocate resources under universalism has not been modeled.
In the model, there is a legislature which consists of members. Each member represents
a district. Members are heterogeneous in both political power and their needs for local
public projects. There is a stock of local public projects in a district, where each project
differs in attributes and political importance. Given an exogenous budget, members need
to pass a distributive omnibus bill of local public project grants. I build a model where
members first consider cooperating as a universal coalition as in Shepsle and Weingast
(1981). In the event that any member disagrees to cooperate, members would play a non-
cooperative bargaining game as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Once money is allocated
across districts, I model how portfolios of projects are chosen within districts following
Nevo, Rubinfeld, and McCabe (2005).
On top of the theoretical innovation, this paper is the first to structurally estimate a
model of universalism to quantify the effects of political power and needs on the agreed-
upon allocations. In the empirical application, I focus on a particular bill which granted
funds for bridge repair and replacement. In U.S., the state of Pennsylvania has the second
largest stock of deficient bridges, which is about 4,783 bridges or equivalently 20.99 percent
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of its total stock.3 Since 1982, the Pennsylvania General Assembly has passed bills,
collectively called the Bridge Bill Capital Budget, to authorize grants for the replacement
and repair of bridges in Pennsylvania. Almost all of these bills received unanimous consent
and allocated funds broadly across bridges in Pennsylvania.4 I construct a unique data
set using one of these bills, passed in 1992, along with bridge-level data from the National
Bridge Inventory (NBI) and the Pennsylvania Manual. Using this data set, I structurally
estimate the model to rationalize how the state legislature allocated $371 million across
844 out of 6,232 possible local bridges in Pennsylvania.
I find that political power, measured by representation in chambers, committees, and
party, has a significant impact on budgetary allocation. Moreover, bridges located in areas
of politicians’ residence are favored. Using the structurally estimated model, I conduct
two counterfactual experiments. First, I simulate the budgetary allocation determined by
a non-cooperative bargaining game to compare the distribution of benefits. I find that
a non-cooperative bargaining game yields highly uneven distribution of money, as the
proposer on average takes about 85.92 percent of the budget. The largest share given
to a member in universalism was 10.01 percent of the budget. Second, I quantitatively
assess the extent to which political factor affects allocations under universalism. In the
model, political power in the legislature may influence geographical allocation of the
budget by diverting more resources to better represented districts. Moreover, given the
budgetary allocation, political importance of projects may affect how funds are granted
across projects within each district. To analyze the extent of these effects, I simulate a
3Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration (https://www.fhwa.
dot.gov/bridge/deficient.cfm)
4Since 1982, 13 bills were passed. 11 bills received unanimous consent in both chambers and 1 bill
received one nay vote.
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benchmark outcome where allocations are determined based only on actual needs. I find
that 16.73 percent of the aggregate budget would be allocated differently across districts.
Moreover, there is a great heterogeneity across districts in the extent to which political
factors affect how bridges are prioritized.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section contains the
literature review. Section 3 contains the model. Section 4 describes the solution and
estimation methods. Section 5 contains the background of the Bridge Bill Capital Budget.
Section 6 contains the description and construction of the data set. Section 7 discusses the
empirical specification and Section 8 contains the empirical results. Section 9 discusses
the counterfactual analysis and Section 10 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Former studies predicted that benefits would be restricted to a minimum winning coalition
for distributive legislation under majority rule (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Riker, 1962).
Studies in the non-cooperative bargaining literature also concluded that the incentive to
concentrate the distribution of benefits results in a minimum winning coalition (Baron,
1991; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Eraslan, 2002; Eraslan and Merlo, 2002). With such a
framework, impact of proposal power could be assessed but unanimous agreement under
majority rule was difficult to explain. On the other hand, papers in the universalism
literature established general conditions under which rational individual legislators ex-
ante prefer universalism over a strict majority-rule system (Weingast, 1979; Shepsle and
Weingast, 1981; Niou and Ordeshook, 1985)5. However, previous works do not explain
how legislators may end up with heterogeneous allocations under universalism given a
5See Weingast (1994) and Collie (1988) for an overview of universalism literature.
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budget. Ex-ante preference for universalism does not necessarily mean that legislators’
preference is aligned. The conflicting incentives to win a greater budgetary share still
persists even under universal cooperation. The framework in previous studies is based on
legislators’ individual calculation of net benefits to decide whether to follow universalism
norm or not. Therefore, a new model is needed to study how legislators strategically
interact to allocate a budget while maintaining universal cooperation. I address this
lacuna by building a model that incorporates a non-cooperative bargaining framework
in a model of universalism. I also add to the previous empirical studies on universalism
that have focused on collecting evidence or testing the universalism hypothesis (Ferejohn,
1974; Stein and Bickers, 1994; Wilson, 1986).
As this paper focuses on allocation shares agreed upon unanimously, the model gen-
erates heterogeneous allocation outcomes but always renders a unanimous coalition in
the equilibrium. However, the size of a winning coalition can range anywhere from bare
majority to unanimity in reality. There is a literature which focuses on the size of a
winning coalition in the equilibrium. For instance, some papers find that super-majority
coalitions arise as an equilibrium outcome with vote buying (Groseclose and Snyder 1996;
Banks 2000). These papers typically analyze a setting in which legislators vote over two
different policy alternatives, rather determining how to divide a budget. An exception is
a paper by Martin (2017), who shows that over-sized coalitions can arise when legislators
allocate spending given a constrained formula. Although the size of a winning coalition
is an interesting issue, I take unanimity as given and focus on allocation outcomes in this
paper. Therefore, I do not analyze all possible voting outcomes that may arise, but focus
on the case when there is a unanimous agreement.
Lastly, there is also a large literature which focuses on different kinds of inefficiencies in
provision of public goods. For example, many theoretical and empirical studies find that
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shared costs and concentrated benefits of local public goods often lead to overspending by
a legislature consisting of multiple districts (Besley and Coate, 2003; Primo and Snyder,
2008; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981). In this application, the budget is fixed so
I do not analyze inefficiency arising from excessive public spending.6 However, I analyze
two ways through which political factors can influence allocation outcomes in line with the
previous literature. First, there is a large literature that empirically assesses whether the
institutional basis of political representation matters in securing higher spendings (Atlas,
Gilligan, Hendershott, and Zupan, 1995; Berry, Burden, and Howell, 2010; Knight, 2005,
2008; Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Primo and Snyder, 2010). Second, there are papers which
analyze whether allocation of resources are influenced by motives to maximize political
returns or electoral benefits (Wright, 1974; Strömberg, 2004, 2008). I quantify the extent
of these two channels in the context of universalism.
3 Model
3.1 Environment
There is a legislature consisting of N members. Each member represents a district and
these two terms will be used interchangeably. Members are heterogeneous in two dimen-
sions—political power and local public project needs. In each district, there is an existing
stock of local public projects. For each project, the member knows the political impor-
tance and project attributes. All members have a list of all projects in their districts, in
which projects are ranked by net benefits in a strictly monotonic way. As a legislature,
6Although inefficiency from overspending is an important topic, I start out with a fixed budget to
model universalism in a tractable way. Endogenizing the budget determination process under universalism
would require a different model.
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members need to pass a distributive omnibus bill of local public project grants. The
aggregate budget of the bill is exogenously given as M¯ . Under majority rule, each mem-
ber casts one vote. Each member has a linear utility function in money. Everything is
complete information.7
3.2 Budgetary Allocation: Legislative Bargaining Game
First, consider a standard non-cooperative, sequential, multilateral bargaining game as
in Baron & Ferejohn (1989) and Eraslan (2002) to allocate M¯ across the districts. Let
M = {m ∈ RN+ :
∑N
j=1mj ≤ M¯} denote the set of feasible budgetary allocations, where
mj refers to the budget share for member j. There are infinitely many discrete sessions
(t = 0, 1, 2, ...) and members share a common discount factor, δ < 1.
At t = 0, member j is selected as a proposer with probability ρj > 0,
∑N
j=1 ρj = 1.
The probability of being selected as a proposer, which is also referred to as the recognition
probability, is heterogeneous across members. The recognition probability for member j
is:
ρj = Pr(Yjα + ξj > Ykα + ξk,∀k 6= j), ∀j.(1)
Yj is a vector of observable characteristics which includes political power and local public
project needs in district j. ξ is a random component assumed to be iid type I extreme
7The complete information assumption is not in fact stringent in this setting. Ultimately, necessary
information about other members is district-level characteristics, which are public and easily observed
in reality (for example, overall quantity and quality of the aggregate stock of projects or committee
membership in the legislature). The model does not rely on knowing other members’ private benefits
from individual projects or their prioritized list of projects.
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value with scale parameter σξ. The proposer makes an allocation offer in M . Under a
closed rule, all members simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject this proposal.
Given a simple majority rule, the budget is allocated accordingly if at least a majority
including the proposer accepts the proposal. If not, the procedure continues to t = 1 and
repeats with a new proposer. The process continues until an allocation is accepted. If an
allocation m ∈ M is accepted at session t, member j’s payoff is δtmj. If no allocation is
ever agreed on, each member receives a payoff of zero.
Let ht denote the past history of the identity of previous proposers, offers made, and
voting outcomes, as well as that information for the current session. Denote a feasible
action for member j at session t by atj(ht), and denote ∆(K) as the set of probability
measures on K. An action for proposer j is atj(ht) ∈ ∆(M), which implies (mixed)
proposal offers made at session t. If member j is not the proposer, then a feasible action
is atj(ht) ∈ ∆({accept, reject}). A strategy profile s is an N -tuple of strategies, where
each strategy sj for member j is a sequence of actions {atj(ht)}∞t=0.
I look for the stationary subgame perfect (SSP) strategies and payoffs of the Leg-
islative Bargaining Game. There are multiple subgame perfect equilibria in multilateral
bargaining games. However, focusing on stationary strategy profiles which do not depend
on the current date and past history gives us a unique equilibrium. Theorems charac-
terizing SSP equilibria and SSP payoffs can be found in Eraslan (2002).8 Here, I restate
in words. The proposer makes an offer to the cheapest coalition of N−12 members. Each
member in this coalition is offered his or her discounted stationary payoff, the proposer
claims the rest of the budget, and the rest are offered zero. Agreement is reached, as the
members in the coalition along with the proposer constitute exactly a majority.
More formally, let r be an N × N matrix whose (j, k)th component is the offering
8See Theorem 1 and 2 in Eraslan (2002).
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probability that member k is a coalition partner of proposer j. Let v be N × 1 stationary
payoff vector. Then a payoff vector v is SSP if and only if there exists r such that satisfies
the following two conditions: 1) given v, r is such that every proposer offers discounted
stationary payoffs to N−12 cheapest members; and 2) given r, v is a fixed point of the
following operator A(·; , r).
Aj(v; r) = ρj
[
M¯ −
N∑
k 6=j
rjkδvk
]
+ δvj
N∑
k 6=j
ρkrkj,∀j.(2)
Eraslan (2002) proved that an SSP equilibrium outcome exists and that the SSP payoff
is unique.9 This implies that even if there are multiple SSP outcomes, they must all yield
the same SSP payoff vector v.
3.3 Budgetary Allocation: Universalism Game
Note that in the Legislative Bargaining Game, N−12 members outside the minimum win-
ning coalition receive zero. As all members would like to avoid the situation of being
excluded, they all get together and consider the possibility of a universal agreement by
playing the Universalism Game. This is in spirit of Shepsle & Weingast (1981), who ar-
gue that due to legislators’ uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions, they
have “ex-ante preference for the outcome deriving from a norm of universalism over the
expected outcome of hardball MWC politics.” However, whereas legislators are risk averse
in Shepsle & Weingast’s setting, members are implicitly assumed to be risk neutral in this
model as they have a linear utility.
At t = 0, each member simultaneously demands a share of the budget M¯ . Member j
demands mj ∈ [0, M¯ ], ∀j. The demands from all members constitute an N × 1 allocation
9See Theorem 3 and 5 in Eraslan (2002).
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vector m = [m1,m2, ...,mN ]′. Each member then decides whether to support universal
agreement with the understanding that any dissent would lead to the Legislative Bar-
gaining Game. If no one defects from cooperation and the budget constraint holds (i.e.∑N
j=1mj ≤ M¯), then the universal allocation is adopted. Note that each member wants to
demand as much as possible. Given a fixed budget, this implies that other members must
receive less, else the budget constraint will be violated. The equilibrium of the budgetary
allocation game is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. m∗ = [m∗1,m∗2, . . . ,m∗N ]′ is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
of the budgetary allocation game if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
m∗j = vj,∀j.(3)
Proof. Without loss of generality, take member j to see if he or she can make a profitable
deviation by changing the demand by a sufficiently small and positive amount . Suppose
member j demands m′j = m∗j − . Trivially, doing so is not profitable. Suppose member
j demands m′j = m∗j + . This implies that some other member, say k, must receive
m′k = m∗k − , else the budget constraint will be violated. However, member k will not
conform to this allocation as the expected payoff from defecting is higher. Lastly, the
uniqueness of m∗ arises from the uniqueness of the stationary payoff vector v in the
Legislative Bargaining Game.
In sum, the subgame perfect equilibrium implies that members immediately and unan-
imously agree on the budgetary allocation, such that each member receives a share which
induces indifference between cooperating and defecting. The threat-point for the break-
down of cooperation comes from the expected payoffs in the Legislative Bargaining Game;
these payoffs are heterogeneous due to the difference in proposal power within the legis-
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lature.10
3.4 Portfolio Allocation
Once the budget is allocated across districts, members need to select projects to grant
funds. As local public projects have geographically concentrated benefits, all members
only care about projects in their own districts. How each member selects a portfolio of
projects is modeled following Nevo, Rubinfeld, and McCabe (2005). Each member has
a list where all projects in his or her district are ranked in a strictly monotonic way.
For example, member j ranks all of K projects in district j, where the subscripts are
enumerated in order for convenience as follows.
X1jβ + 1j > X2jβ + 2j > · · · > XKjβ + Kj.(4)
Xij denotes a vector of variables capturing political importance, cost, and other attributes
of project i in district j. ij is unobserved to the econometrician, but known to member
j. Given the budgetary allocation and a stock of projects, each member selects the top
projects on the ranking list which satisfy the budget constraint.
Note that this method ignores the non-divisibility issue. For example, suppose that
the sum of costs for the first w projects exceeds m∗j , but the sum of costs for the first
(w− 1) projects and the cost of another project further down the list satisfies the budget.
10Here I develop an intuitive and estimable model which generates heterogeneous allocation shares
agreed upon unanimously. The empirical implementation of the model is feasible given the tractability
of the bargaining framework along with its prediction of unique equilibrium payoffs. One can come up
with various theoretical models such as those that allow other types of negotiations, introduce concave
utility functions, etc. However, this would greatly complicate structural estimation of the model without
changing much of the underlying intuition.
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In this case, the model suggests that only the first (w − 1) projects are granted funds.11
Moreover, there is no strategic manipulation in the ranking once the budgetary allocation
is determined.
Once all members select portfolios of local public projects, this comprises the distribu-
tive, omnibus bill passed in the legislature under universalism. The equilibrium outcome
is unique, given strictly monotonic rankings of projects and the unique stationary payoffs
from the non-cooperative bargaining game.
4 Solution, Estimation, and Identification
The equilibrium outcome of this model is the budgetary allocation across selected indi-
vidual projects of an omnibus bill. This is difficult to solve in general, given a large stock
of projects and numerous possible ways to select portfolios. However, the implementation
of this model is made feasible by the modeling strategy that I adopt to solve it separately.
I determine first how the budget is allocated across districts. Then given a budgetary
allocation, I determine how each member selects a portfolio of projects within his or her
district. The separation arises because benefits are geographically concentrated for local
public projects.12
11In the estimation, the budget is always exhausted by definition. Non-divisibility issue only arises in
the counterfactual simulation and I discuss this in footnote 28. See an alternative model in Appendix
A.2, where a member chooses the set that maximizes his or her utility among feasible sets given the
budget. Projects are chosen set-wise so that the budget is exhausted up to the cost of the cheapest
project. However, this method can only be implemented computationally when the stock of projects is
sufficiently small.
12For projects with externalities across districts, this separation may not be appropriate and one would
need to model how members interact over portfolios of projects.
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4.1 Budgetary Allocation
In the budgetary allocation problem, I solve for the stationary payoff vector v in the
Legislative Bargaining Game. This requires solving for an equilibrium pair (r, v) which
satisfies the equilibrium conditions. I elaborate on the solution method in Appendix A.1.
Given the uniqueness of the stationary payoff vector v proved by Eraslan (2002), I just
need to find an equilibrium pair. The uniqueness in v has been used in many empirical
applications in the non-cooperative bargaining literature due to its advantageous feature
(Eraslan, 2008; Adachi and Watanabe, 2008; etc.).
The equilibrium condition of the budgetary allocation game is m∗j = vj, ∀j. The
vector of money shares m is observed in the data and the stationary payoff vector v
is solved analytically from the theoretical model in a closed form. As observed money
shares will not be exactly equal to theoretical solutions in the empirical application, the
residual difference will be captured by an N × 1 vector of random shocks denoted as
η. The η captures heterogeneous net benefits from avoiding unobserved consequences
when universalism breaks down. For example, when universal cooperation breaks down,
some members will get nothing. As a result, they will face finger-pointing and how their
constituents evaluate the outcome against them will be heterogeneous. The η is known to
all members but not observed to the econometrician. The idea is to search for parameters
that minimize the difference between m and v.
By definition, i′m = M¯ always holds in the data where i is an N × 1 vector of units.
Similarly, i′v = M¯ always holds in the theoretical model as well. This implies that
i′η = 0. Assume that η is an order-N normal vector of random variables, where each
random variable has a mean of 0. Let the covariance matrix of η be σ2η(IN − ii
′
N
), where
IN is an N × N identity matrix. Note that matrix P = (IN − ii′N ) is the Moore Penrose
inverse of itself and P = PPP holds. The covariance matrix P induces dependence in
14
η which respects the restriction that i′η = 0 as Pi = 0. Therefore, the log likelihood
function can be written as:
logL(δ, ~α, σξ, ση; ~Y , M¯,m) = −N2 log(2piσ
2
η)−
1
2σ2η
(m− v)′P (m− v),(5)
where the stationary payoff vector v is a function of parameters (δ, ~α, σξ) and data (~Y , M¯).
Another alternative is to estimate as in Adachi and Watanabe (2008). Given the
aggregate budget, information contained in N members is equivalent to information con-
tained in any (N -1) members. Therefore, they drop a member and treat (N -1) residuals
as independent and identically distributed. However, as the asymmetry issue can arise,
papers dealing with restricted likelihoods in other contexts have often used generalized
inverse matrix as in this paper.13 This directly respects the restriction, addresses the
singularity problem, and uses all data without arbitrarily dropping one observation.
The parameters for the budgetary allocation problem include (1) the discount factor
δ, (2) the recognition probability parameters ~α which interact with the observables ~Y , (3)
the distribution parameter σξ for the unobservables ξ, and (4) the distribution parameter
ση for the unobservables η. Note that vj − ηj needs to be non-negative for all j as it
is equal to the budget share. In the estimation algorithm, I check that no member ever
receives a negative money share.14
I discuss how these key parameters are identified. First, the recognition probability pa-
rameters ~α are identified from the variation in attributes ~Y and money shares m. Eraslan
13An analogous context is estimating a system of demand equations. In this case, the covariance
matrix of residuals is singular when predicted values of each commodity is equal to the actuals (Barten
1969; Deaton 1974).
14All components of vector v are always positive. As long as ση is sufficiently small, vj − ηj will be
non-negative for all j.
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(2002) proved that the stationary payoffs are monotone non-decreasing in the recogni-
tion probabilities when the discount factor is common across all members. For instance, a
member with a higher value of an attribute in ~Y will have a higher recognition probability
when the corresponding α is larger and the payoff will be monotone non-decreasing, hold-
ing all other things constant. With the iid type I extreme value distribution assumption
on the ξ-s, ~α is identified up to scale with respect to σξ.
Identification of the discount factor δ comes from information at the extreme ends,
given that there is a large variance in the money shares m. Intuitively, a member with the
largest money share has a very large stationary payoff. As his or her vote is expensive to
buy, it is unlikely that others will include that member as a coalition partner when they
are selected as a proposer. Similarly, a member with the lowest money share is always
likely to be included as a coalition partner by others. The offering probabilities matrix r
that solves the fixed point operator in equation (2) is restricted for stationary payoffs at
the extreme ends. Therefore, the functional forms of stationary payoffs at the extremes
are different and this helps to identify δ. Note that if there is not much variance in the
payoffs, this argument does not hold as the functional forms of stationary payoffs will not
differ across members.15 Lastly, ση is identified from the difference between the stationary
payoffs and monetary shares.
15Mitsutsune and Adachi (2014) discuss identification of parameters in a bargaining game when infor-
mation on ex-post payoffs are used under unanimity rule. What helps to identify the discount factor δ in
their setting is that there is one observed proposer and that functional forms of stationary payoffs differ
between proposer and non-proposer.
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4.2 Portfolio Allocation
To estimate the portfolio allocation problem, I refer to Nevo, Rubinfeld, and McCabe
(2005). Let P denote a portfolio of chosen projects and let #(P) be the number of
projects in the set P . Denote S as the aggregate set of projects in a district, so the
projects not selected by a member are in the set S\P . Suppose the ranking of projects
is known, and for simplicity, assume subscripts for projects are given by their rankings.
Then the probability of ranking projects in such way is:
Pr(ranking) = Pr(1  2  · · ·  #(P)  S \ P )
=
∏
S
(1)×∏
S\1
(2)× · · · × ∏
S\{1,2,...,#(P )−1}
(#(P)),(6)
where ∏X(i) is the probability that project i is ranked the highest in set X of available
projects. This implies that when projects are ranked by their net benefits, then X1β + 1
is the highest in the set S; X2β + 2 is the highest in the set S \ 1; and so on. Let -s
be independent and identically distributed type I extreme value with scale parameter σ.
Then Pr(ranking) can be written in a closed-form as the following:
Pr(ranking| ~X; ~β, σ) =
exp(X1β
σ
)
ΣSk=1exp(Xkβσ )
× exp(
X2β
σ
)
ΣSk=2exp(Xkβσ )
× · · · × exp(
X#(P )β
σ
)
ΣSk=#(P )exp(
Xkβ
σ
)
.(7)
Although the chosen projects must be ranked higher than those that were not chosen, the
actual ranking is not known. Therefore, I sum the probabilities of all possible rankings
that yield the observed portfolio, where #(P)! is the total number of all possible rankings
for the portfolio P :
Pr(P| ~X; ~β, σ) =
#(P)!∑
k=1
Pr(rankingk| ~X; ~β, σ).(8)
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For districts with a large number of projects, calculating this probability over all pos-
sible combinations of rankings is not computationally feasible. In this case, I simulate
50,000 rankings from the set of all possible rankings to compute an estimate of the aver-
age probability. The parameters of the portfolio allocation problem are estimated using
the simulated maximum likelihood. The parameters of interests are (1) the net bene-
fits parameters ~β which interact with ~X and (2) the distribution parameter σ for the
unobservables .
L =
N∏
j=1
Pr(Pj| ~Xj; ~β, σ).(9)
As this method does not require solving for all feasible sets and the likelihood comes out
in a closed-form, the computation becomes quite fast.
The likelihood function in equation (5) for the budgetary allocation and that in equa-
tion (9) for the portfolio allocation are separately estimated. They are two independent
likelihood functions for distinct problems and the sets of parameters do not coincide.
Typically, the separation would not be possible as portfolios of projects would need to
be chosen with respect to the allocated budget shares. However, the method of Nevo,
Rubinfeld, and McCabe (2005) does not explicitly solve for the optimal set of projects
given a budget constraint. It simply recovers the preference parameters that determine
how projects are ranked. As the model ignores the non-divisibility issue, the underlying
ranking of projects does not depend on a budget. In estimation, the budget is exhausted
by definition for all districts as the sum of costs for all chosen projects is always equal to
the budget share. Therefore, the two likelihoods can be set up and estimated separately
with this modeling technique.
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5 Background on the Bridge Bill Capital Budget
For the empirical application of this paper, I focus on a specific bill of grants for bridges.
As shown in Table 1, Pennsylvania has the second largest stock of structurally deficient
bridges in the U.S.16
Table 1: National Rankings and State Data
State Rank Total No. of No. of Structurally Percentage of Total
Bridges Deficient Bridges
Iowa 1 24,242 5,025 20.73
Pennsylvania 2 22,783 4,783 20.99
Oklahoma 3 23,049 3,776 16.38
Missouri 4 24,398 3,222 13.21
Nebraska 5 15,341 2,474 16.13
National Totals 611,845 58,791 9.61
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 2015.
(http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/deficient.cfm)
In 1982, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed Act 235 (also known as the “Billion
Dollar Bridge Bill” or the “Bridge Bill Capital Budget”) to authorize funding for repair,
rehabilitation, or replacement of public bridges in Pennsylvania. The Bridge Bill Capital
Budget (BBCB) is unique to Pennsylvania and serves as the multi-year legal basis for
bridge spending. It is an omnibus of bridge grants only, and it itemizes the estimated
cost and project type for each bridge in the bill. The bill is financed by the Motor
License Fund17 or by incurring debt. As more bridges deteriorated throughout the years,
16A bridge classified as structurally deficient by the Federal Highway Administration implies that
it typically requires significant maintenance and repair to remain in service. Moreover, it needs to be
eventually rehabilitated or replaced to address deficiencies.
17The Motor License Fund is a special state government account which funds the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Transportation projects—construction, maintenance, replacement, and safety measures on
highways and bridges in the Commonwealth. It is capitalized through motor fuels taxes, vehicle registra-
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Figure 1: Distribution of Money by the BBCB 1992 for Local Bridges
Note: Quintiles are: [$0,$432,600], [$432,601, $2,579,800], [$2,579,801, $5,362,200],
[$5,362,201, $8,673,400], and [$8,673,401, $37,137,000].
Figure 2: Distribution of Local Bridges in Pennsylvania in 1992
Note: Quintiles are: [12, 42], [43, 66], [67, 91], [92, 128], and [129,372].
the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed five amendment acts in the 1980s and seven
supplemental acts since the 1990s to authorize additional grants.
One striking feature of the BBCB is uncontroversial passage. Excluding legislators
who were absent or abstained from voting, almost all of the enacted BBCB bills received
unanimous consent in both chambers.18 Another feature of the BBCB is the broad and
heterogeneous allocation of benefits. Figure 1 shows the distribution of money for local
tion fees, operator’s license fees, etc.
18There are two exceptions. The first bill in 1982 received two nay votes in the Senate and forty-one
nay votes in the House. The other exception is the bill passed in 1986, which received one nay vote in
the House. Except for these two bills, all other bills received unanimous legislative agreement in both
chambers.
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bridges across counties by the BBCB in 1992. Counties are divided into quintiles, where
each quintile corresponds to a different shade and the highest quintile is displayed in the
darkest shade. The figure shows that money allocation was quite heterogeneous across 67
counties. One reaches the same conclusion with BBCB passed in other years as well. In
Figure 2, I similarly show the distribution of local bridges across counties in Pennsylvania.
The BBCB satisfies the ideal-type of distributive legislation, in which it takes the
form of an omnibus bill with divisible benefits. Moreover, it is a near-perfect empirical
application of the model as it displays the typical features of universalism. Therefore, I
use one of the BBCB passed in 1992 in my empirical application. Naturally, there are
many empirical applications for this model. One only requires a distributive omnibus bill
of local projects which received unanimous legislative consent, and this can be commonly
found in many contexts.19
6 Data
I construct a data set by combining data from three different sources: (1) BBCB passed
in 1992; (2) National Bridge Inventory; and (3) Pennsylvania Manual.
6.1 Bridge Bill Capital Budget of 1992
First, I use the BBCB passed in 1992, which is available from the legislative archive of
the Pennsylvania General Assembly website.20 For each authorized bridge, the BBCB
stipulates bridge descriptions (e.g., location, route carried, features crossed, etc.), project
19For distributive legislations consisting of heterogeneous types of local public projects, the application
of the model would be feasible if one can define the set of available projects and a way to measure benefits.
20http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/bills/
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types (e.g., rehabilitation, replacement, reconstruction), and estimated costs. Moreover,
information on the aggregate budget, relevant committees involved in referral process,
and the vote outcomes in both chambers are available. I focus on the allocations for the
local bridges whose benefits are geographically concentrated. Local bridges are defined as
those owned by the County Highway Agency, the Town/Township Highway Agency, and
the City/Municipal Highway Agency.21 Theoretically, any BBCB passed with unanimous
legislative consent can be used for the empirical application. However, the other data set
that I combine with the bill is available only since 1992, so I chose the first one available.22
The 1992 bill allocated around $371 million across 844 out of 6,232 possible local bridges
in Pennsylvania.
6.2 National Bridge Inventory
Along with the BBCB, I combine data from the National Bridge Inventory (NBI). This
data is available on the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of the U.S. Department
of Transportation website.23 NBI is a bridge-level data set which is annually reported
21The BBCB also granted funds to state bridges, which are owned by the State Highway Agency. Given
the size, location, and usage, state bridges are likely to have greater externalities than local bridges. The
average length of the bridge structure is 39.5m for state bridges and 20.7m for local bridges. State
bridges usually lie at the highway intersection or cross rivers, whereas local bridges usually lie at roads
and streets, crossing creeks and run. The average daily traffic of state bridges is about 5,331 vehicles,
compared to 985 vehicles for local bridges. Moreover, given the large size of Pennsylvania (119,283km2),
local bridges are most likely to be used by nearby residents.
22For an external validation analysis, I use the two subsequent bills passed in 1994 and 1999 to see how
well estimated parameters from the 1992 bill can predict allocation outcomes. The results are reported
in Appendix A.4.
23http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/nbi/ascii.cfm
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since 1992. It has information on all public bridges in the U.S., of which there are over
600,000. Around 116 variables are reported for every bridge, including bridge descriptions
(location, feature crossed, water facility), usage measures (average daily traffic), technical
ratings (condition rating, operating rating, inventory rating), public essentiality measures
(historical significance, importance in military defense, detour length), and annual oper-
ating status (open, closed, restricted usage, under replacement). This is a technical data
set reported by certified technicians. The advantage of such a data set is that it gives the
universe of possible bridge projects and objective measures of needs for each individual
bridge. I use the information for the universe of 6,232 local bridges in Pennsylvania in
1992. Descriptive statistics on the number of local bridges and average quality measured
by the average sufficiency ratings for 67 counties in Pennsylvania are shown in Table 2.24
Since the NBI data does not provide any information on whether a bridge was au-
thorized by the BBCB or not, I link the bridges in the bill to the NBI data using the
following criteria: (1) county code; (2) place code (township, borough, city); (3) facil-
ity carried by bridge (SR/PA/US/TR number or road name); (4) feature crossed (creek,
river, lake, railroad); and (5) segment number or other additional location description, if
mentioned. The goal of the BBCB is to allocate funds for replacement, reconstruction,
and rehabilitation of deteriorated bridges. However, some irrelevant projects such as new
bridge construction or painting are included, so I exclude those. Sometimes two or more
descriptions for a bridge in the bill could not be distinguished from one another given the
information available there. In these cases, I keep the first occurrence and drop any oth-
24A sufficiency rating is an overall rating of a bridge’s fitness for the duty it performs, derived from
multiple dimensions of technical evaluations. It ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 represents an entirely
sufficient bridge and 0 represents an entirely insufficient or deficient bridge. It is the common rating
formula adopted by the FHWA.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Bridge Characteristics by County
County No. of Sufficiency County No. of Sufficiency
Local Bridges Rating Local Bridges Rating
Adams 70 75.25 Lackawanna 81 49.28
Allegheny 372 65.52 Lancaster 267 63.55
Armstrong 70 58.47 Lawrence 71 54.81
Beaver 55 65.39 Lebanon 93 79.93
Bedford 86 63.23 Lehigh 113 67.28
Berks 194 72.46 Luzerne 107 53.96
Blair 110 69.36 Lycoming 112 64.08
Bradford 130 63.15 Mckean 83 57.39
Bucks 159 64.22 Mercer 170 79.33
Butler 152 51.56 Miﬄin 50 62.57
Cambria 81 61.38 Monroe 56 71.98
Cameron 12 60.43 Montgomery 214 63.88
Carbon 28 68.17 Montour 32 55.82
Centre 60 58.53 Northampton 125 70.11
Chester 153 59.60 Northumberland 97 69.59
Clarion 67 51.08 Perry 50 57.98
Clearfield 76 52.33 Philadelphia 138 62.78
Clinton 21 65.70 Pike 37 71.48
Columbia 91 59.85 Potter 40 58.00
Crawford 125 49.57 Schuylkill 154 68.55
Cumberland 63 67.41 Snyder 34 68.67
Dauphin 105 76.56 Somerset 79 53.15
Delaware 65 64.61 Sullivan 36 58.29
Elk 35 56.84 Susquehanna 59 70.35
Erie 109 65.95 Tioga 100 65.90
Fayette 110 58.75 Union 40 67.12
Forest 14 46.47 Venango 60 46.24
Franklin 96 75.27 Warren 65 53.34
Fulton 24 62.63 Washington 147 48.10
Greene 91 42.11 Wayne 68 44.88
Huntingdon 57 62.61 Westmoreland 145 57.15
Indiana 88 72.18 Wyoming 26 57.06
Jefferson 51 57.22 York 221 73.63
Juniata 42 72.85
Source: NBI of 1992.
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ers. Lastly, some of bridges in the bill have incomplete descriptions, which makes them to
be difficult to be identified. After dropping a total of 43 local bridges in the bill for these
reasons, I am left with 844 local bridges, of which I match 644 bridges to the NBI data.
The matching fails to be perfect as descriptions in the bill are sometimes not sufficient to
uniquely match bridges, or lacks additional information that is necessary. Nevertheless,
the matching of individual bridges does not affect the budgetary allocation problem, and
instead only affects the portfolio allocation problem.
6.3 Pennsylvania Manual
Lastly, I refer to the Pennsylvania Manual to obtain information on the political envi-
ronment of the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1992. The Pennsylvania Manual is a
comprehensive guide to Pennsylvania’s government, which is published biennially by the
Department of General Services for the Commonwealth. I collect information on 50 sena-
tors and 203 House members, such as representing district, committee membership, party
affiliation, and residential address. These variables are used to construct a representation
in the legislature which affects the proposal power in the budgetary allocation game or
preference in ranking bridges in the portfolio allocation.
In general, legislatures are either unicameral or bicameral, and the model of this
paper focuses on a generalized unicameral legislature. The theoretical literature on non-
cooperative bargaining is much more advanced in a unicameral setting. Studies on a
bicameral legislature mostly rely on indices from cooperative theory such as the Shapley-
Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954), and there are only few studies that take a
non-cooperative approach (Diermeier and Myerson 1999; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ting
2003). As this is the first study to analyze allocations under universalism, I focus on a
general theoretical setting of a unicameral legislature which gives tractable results.
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In the empirical analysis, however, a further assumption needs to be made as the
Pennsylvania state legislature has two chambers.25 That is, the two chambers’ information
needs to be combined at a common district level. I use county as the district unit, as the
bill itemizes bridges by counties and the number of counties is feasible for computation.26
I define a ‘member’ representing a county as a group of all senators and House members
who represent all or a part of this county in his or her legislative district and act together.
For example, if a senator represents a part of Beaver county and a part of Lawrence
county, I add one senator to these two counties. In this way, I combine representation
information from both chambers and incorporate this into the recognition probability.
This assumption is not to suggest that a bicameral legislature in fact operates as a
unicameral legislature. Strategic interactions can potentially exist across chambers, but
this is difficult to observe in the data and my model does not capture them. Given
my assumption, the model focuses on how money is allocated geographically as a group
of politicians who commonly represent a county fight together to win more. It does not
consider what happens within a county among individual politicians or between politicians
across two chambers. With these caveats in consideration, the rest of empirical analysis
will be implemented at the county level. At the same time, I further discuss the validity
of this assumption by exploring an alternative of using the actual Senate districts in
Appendix A.3.
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of representation in the General Assembly
25The Pennsylvania state legislature was originally unicameral until 1830. One example of a unicameral
state legislature in U.S. is the Nebraska state legislature. Unicameral legislatures are also quite common
at national and subnational levels in other countries.
26If the number of districts is N , the model needs to solve for an inverse of N × N matrix in the
equilibrium. As N grows, it becomes computationally intensive to solve the model.
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by county. Overall, we see that the representation of counties is quite heterogeneous. This
is true not only in terms of the number of representatives in chambers, but also in terms of
party affiliation, committee membership, and seniority of politicians. For example, some
counties have no representation in Rules & Executive Nominations committee, whereas
counties such as Philadelphia has as many as 9 members. The seniority of politicians
representing a county is constructed by adding all the previous terms served by every
senator and House member representing that county.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Representation in the General Assembly by County
Mean Min Max Standard Dev.
No. of senators 1.77 1 8 1.35
No. of House members 4.01 1 29 4.81
No. of Democratic senators 0.59 0 6 1.05
No. of Democratic House members 2.07 0 23 3.92
No. of Transportation committee members 0.95 0 6 1.16
No. of Appropriations committee members 1.40 0 8 1.52
No. of Rules & Executive Nominations members 0.76 0 9 1.38
Seniority in the Senate 8.94 3 45 7.27
Seniority in the House 19.23 1 149 26.23
Source: The Pennsylvania Manual Vol.110.
For each bridge, I also track reported home address of each politician in the Pennsyl-
vania Manual at the place or county subdivision level, such as borough, township, or city.
For instance, Adams county is divided into 34 subdivisions. Using the 5-digit FIPS code
reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, I link the home address with the location of each
bridge. This is to see whether bridges located in the county subdivision of politicians’
residence receive preferential treatments given all other things equal. Alternatively, one
can think of other indicators that capture political importance of bridges. I elaborate
on other political indicators that were specified and estimated in the empirical results
section.
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7 Empirical Specification
7.1 Recognition probability
In the model, counties are heterogeneous in political power in the legislature and in
the actual local bridge needs. This heterogeneity yields different probabilities of being
selected as a proposer in the Legislative Bargaining Game. The probability that county
j is recognized as a proposer is denoted as ρj.
ρj = Pr(Yjα + ξj > Ykα + ξk,∀k 6= j), where(10)
Yjα = α1 · log(number of legislatorsj) + α2 · I(no Democratsj)(11)
+ α3 · I(Represented in all relevant committeesj)
+ α4 · citiesj + α5 · areaj + α6 · area2j + α7 · I(lowest county classj)
+ α8 · log(number of bridgesj) + α9 · (share of closed bridgesj)
+ α10 · I(no historically significant bridgesj).
ξ-s are iid type I extreme value with scale parameter σξ.
The first three terms in Y reflect the political features of a county in the legislature.
The first variable which interacts with α1 is the number of all politicians representing
county j in the state legislature. The second variable is an indicator which equals to one
if there are no Democrats representing county j. The variable which interacts with α3 is an
indicator which equals to one if county j is represented in all the relevant committees for
this bill, which are the Transportation, Appropriations, or Rules & Executive Nominations
Committees. As the previous literature often finds that having greater representation
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in the chambers or relevant committees can be advantageous, α1 and α3 capture these
effects. Also, whether legislators belong in the majority party can affect their proposal
power. The majority party of the Senate and the House in the Pennsylvania General
Assembly of 1991-1992 were the Republican party and the Democratic party respectively.
α3 captures the effect of having all the representatives from the Republican party when
two chambers were occupied by different parties.
The next four terms in Y interacted with parameters α4 to α7 are related to county
characteristics. They are: the number of cities in a county, area, area squared, and
an indicator capturing a county’s classification. For the purposes of legislation and the
regulation of their affairs, the Pennsylvania General Assembly has an act which divides
counties into nine classes based on population and inhabitants. If a county belongs to
one of the lowest two county classification, then this indicator is equal to 1. These four
variables capture the needs of a county given its population density or geographical size.
The last three terms in Y interacting with parameters α8 to α10 are related to a
county’s bridge stock characteristics in terms of quantity and quality. They are: the
total number of local bridges, share of closed bridges, and an indicator that a county
has no historically significant bridges. In the NBI data, a bridge can be classified as
having historical significance if it is a particularly unique engineering example, or if the
crossing itself is significant, or if the bridge is associated with significant circumstances. If
a county has no historically significant bridge at all, the indicator variable equals to one;
it is zero otherwise. Given iid type I extreme value assumption on the ξ-s, the recognition
probability becomes:
ρj =
exp(Yjα
σξ
)∑N
k=1 exp(Ykασξ )
.(12)
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Lastly, one may consider the following caveats. Attributes ~Y are assumed to be ex-
ogenous but this assumption may not hold for some features, particularly for political
variables. For instance, gerrymandering may cause correlations between political features
in ~Y and the error term ξ. Also, it may be possible that districts with greater needs
for the BBCB funds joined the relevant committees. In this case, committee affiliation
would be endogenous. As for the second issue, the three committees are all involved with
many bills other than the BBCB bill. For instance, the Transportation committee also
makes decisions for other various types of transportation infrastructures such as roads,
railways, transit, and etc. Furthermore, as I control for the quantity and quality of the
bridge stock, this may be less of an issue.
7.2 Net benefit from a bridge project
Next, I specify the net benefit from a bridge i in district j, which is denoted as uij:
uij = Xijβ + ij.(13)
Xij is a vector of observable characteristics of bridge i, and ij is unobserved to the
econometrician. It is assumed to be iid type I extreme value with scale parameter σ.
Xijβ = β1 · ratingi + β2 · I(restrictedi) + β3 · log(costi)(14)
+ β4 · I(senatori) + β5 · I(House memberi).
The first three variables interacting with β1 to β3 are related to the technical attributes of
a bridge. They are the sufficiency rating, the indicator of whether a bridge is restricted,
and the log of project cost. β2 is interacted with an indicator which equals to 1 if a
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bridge is posted for various types of restrictions including speed, load-capacity, number
of vehicles, etc.
The last two variables interacting with β4 to β5 are related to non-technical attributes
which may affect politicians’ preferential treatment of bridges. This is captured by
whether a bridge is located in an area of politicians’ residence. For instance, I(senatori)
is equal to 1 if at least one senator lives in the place or county subdivision of where
bridge i is located. Vice versa holds for the I(House memberi) variable. Therefore, these
variables yield heterogeneous political attributes across bridges located within the same
county.
7.3 Cost of a bridge project
The information of bridge costs is obtained from the BBCB. This means that the cost
data is only available for bridges that were authorized by the bill, so costs for the rest of
bridges need to be imputed. I specify the cost of a bridge denoted by pi as below. Each
variable is technical bridge attribute, which I obtain from the NBI data. I estimate the
parameters using Ordinary Least Squares.
log(pi) = κ1 + κ2 · structure lengthi + κ3 · structure length2i(15)
+ κ4 · I(ratingi = L) + κ5 · I(ratingi = M) + κ6 · lanes underi
+ κ7 · areai + κ8 · area2i + κ9 · I(functional classi = 1)
+ κ10 · deck width2i + κ11 · I(lanes oni = H)
+ κ12 · I(main unit spansi = H) + κ13 ·max span lengthi
+ κ14 · I(curbi = H) + κ15 · deck widthi
+ κ16 · I(historical significancei) + ωi.
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8 Empirical Results
8.1 Budgetary allocation
The estimated parameters and standard errors for the budgetary allocation problem are
shown in Table 4. The standard errors are computed by estimating the information ma-
trix, using the outer product of the scores of the likelihood function. The coefficients
have signs that align with expectations. Of 13 parameters, 9 of them are statistically
significant at 1 percent and 1 of them is statistically significant at 5 percent. I find that
the effect of political channels, measured by representation in chambers and party, is
still significant even after controlling for various dimensions of county characteristics and
actual bridge needs. Having a larger number of legislators and being represented in all
relevant committees have a positive impact on securing a larger share of the budget, al-
though committee representation is not statistically significant at standard levels. Having
all the representatives from the Republican party has a negative impact given that two
chambers were occupied by different parties. On top of political features, the attributes
related to scale of counties and their bridge needs also matter. Counties with a larger
number of cities, larger area, greater number of local bridges, and greater share of closed
bridges receive larger budget shares. The model was estimated with numerous different
specifications and joint test was used for model selection.27
The discount factor between sessions is estimated to be 0.73. Many empirical studies
in the non-cooperative legislative bargaining literature find discount factor to be lower
than that typically found for other economic agents (Adachi & Watanabe, 2008; Merlo,
27Some variables may have a priori reason to be included based on previous findings in the literature.
Multiple dimensions of political features (for example, chairman, party, seniority, committee membership,
etc.) were specified in the estimation to see what mattered.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates for the Budgetary Allocation Problem
Variable Estimate S.E.
〈Political power〉
α1 Log(Number of legislators) 0.5273 0.1971
α2 I(No Democrats) -1.2975 0.6047
α3 I(Represented in all relevant committees) 0.4113 0.3038
〈County characteristics〉
α4 Number of cities 0.3520 0.0793
α5 Area 0.6618 0.2050
α6 Area squared -0.0672 0.0155
α7 Indicator of lowest county class -2.6725 1.8569
〈Bridge needs〉
α8 Log of number of bridges 0.0840 0.0735
α9 Share of closed bridges 9.0270 1.6895
α10 I(No historically significant bridges) -1.4986 0.2893
〈Miscellaneous〉
σξ Scale parameter for the ξ distribution 1.5109 0.2371
δ Discount factor 0.7302 0.1001
ση Standard deviation for the η distribution 0.0071 0.0008
Log likelihood 236.64
1997; etc.). The greater impatience of political agents is due to the uncertainty and
risk associated with turnover in the legislature. Also, the standard deviation for the
η distribution is very small. This implies that the budgetary shares determined under
universalism are well captured by the expected payoffs in the Legislative Bargaining Game.
Tables 5 through 7 present evidence on how well the model fits the data. Table 5
compares budget shares by committee membership in the data and those generated by
the model. The fit is reasonably close and representation in relevant committees seems to
be valuable as it is associated with greater budgetary shares. For example, the aggregate
share for seven counties that have no committee member in either chamber is 5 percent of
the aggregate budget. However, another seven counties which have at least one chairman
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Table 5: Fit of the Budget Shares by Committees (Unit: Percent)
Budget Share of Counties with Membership in: Data Model No. of Counties
Senate committee chair 35.45 39.05 16
Senate Transportation 41.01 47.01 26
Senate Appropriations 62.35 66.67 38
Senate Rules & Executive Nominations 44.07 46.86 19
No Senate committee 32.31 26.55 26
House committee chair 22.20 24.76 7
House Transportation 42.74 43.58 22
House Appropriations 60.45 60.90 26
House Rules & Executive Nominations 40.59 43.06 18
No House committee 21.46 21.77 23
No Senate nor House committee 5.08 3.93 7
Table 6: Fit of the Budget Shares by Representation in the Chambers (Unit: Percent)
No. of Senators One Two Three or More
Data 40.05 24.21 35.74
Model 39.28 25.14 35.58
No. of counties 40 15 12
No. of House Members One Two Three Four Five or More
Data 12.76 6.32 16.29 19.63 45.00
Model 11.65 9.17 16.33 15.95 46.90
No. of counties 18 11 14 7 17
in one of the relevant committees in the House collectively receive 22 percent of the budget.
Similarly, I look at the model fit by representation in chambers in Table 6, measured
by the number of senators and House members representing a county. The model can fit
the fact that counties with greater number of politicians tend to receive larger shares of
the budget. Lastly in Table 7, I compare the model fit by criteria not related to political
power. Each column represents a quintile given the criteria. Overall, predictions of the
model match the outcomes in the data fairly well, even for criteria that were not used in
the estimation such as number of vehicles or average daily traffic.
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Table 7: Fit of the Budget Shares by Needs (Unit: Percent)
Quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
No. of local bridges Data 3.60 13.78 22.06 18.65 41.92
Model 5.01 14.85 21.61 17.28 41.24
Bridge rating Data 20.93 11.79 21.63 29.86 15.80
Model 19.47 14.12 17.09 29.27 20.05
Average daily traffic Data 7.70 11.93 15.13 22.38 42.87
Model 8.27 11.16 13.32 24.22 43.03
Population Data 3.22 11.72 16.07 25.87 43.12
Model 3.95 11.73 18.48 24.91 40.93
No. of vehicles Data 5.56 10.58 14.62 26.12 43.12
Model 5.84 9.97 17.54 25.71 40.93
8.2 Portfolio Allocation
In Table 8, I show the estimated parameters and standard errors for the portfolio alloca-
tion problem. As before, the standard errors are computed by estimating the information
matrix, using the outer product of the scores of the likelihood function. Among 67 coun-
ties, 9 counties received no money for local bridges in the 1992 bill. That leaves 58 counties
and I focus on 55 counties which have sufficiently high match rates.
Table 8: Parameter Estimates for the Portfolio Allocation
Variable Estimate S.E.
β1 Sufficiency rating -0.0382 0.0050
β2 I(Restricted) 0.2897 0.0497
β3 Log of bridge cost 0.2675 0.0352
β4 I(senator) 0.0274 0.0064
β5 I(House member) 0.6305 0.0954
σ Scale parameter for type I extreme value 1.7973 0.2155
Log likelihood -1575.13
I estimate how counties rank bridges to choose a set of bridges. Bridges with greater
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deterioration rating and restricted usage are more likely to receive a higher rank. A bridge
with higher sufficiency rating implies less deterioration, so the coefficient for β1 comes
out as negative as expected. β2 captures various kinds of restrictions including weight
and speed limits. In the estimation, the coefficient for cost of bridges, β3, comes out as
positive. One explanation for the positive coefficient is that politicians may prefer projects
which have bigger scale in terms of spendings due to their impact on local economy. All
other things being equal, a bridge located in a county subdivision where politicians live is
favored. This is captured by β4 and β5, which are positive and statistically significant at
1 percent. This estimation result shows that beyond the technical attributes of bridges,
private returns of politicians also matter in how bridges are prioritized.
Other political measures were also estimated using various specifications. For instance,
I looked at whether a group of politicians representing a county which consists of more
Republicans prefer bridges located in county subdivisions with greater number of Re-
publican voters. In addition, the number and margin of votes in the 1990 Pennsylvania
gubernatorial election were also analyzed. This is to see whether the governor, who has
the right to veto the bill passed by the legislature, has influence over the selection of
bridges. Although estimate parameters have expected signs showing positive impact of
political factors, they were statistically insignificant or ruled out by the joint test.
Table 9: Fit of Portfolio Allocation for Selected Counties
Money by Tertile 1st 2nd 3rd
No. of chosen bridges Data 2.78 13.11 18.74
Model 2.48 11.96 23.13
Length of chosen bridges Data 188.58 167.96 316.49
Model 225.21 193.89 301.74
Rating of chosen bridges Data 44.50 46.03 54.89
Model 22.43 35.04 41.71
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In Table 9, I show the model fit for the portfolio problem. Given the estimated
parameters and the budget shares, I simulate the portfolio allocation numerous times.
To show the model fit, I divide 55 counties into tertiles based on the amount of money
received. Then I compare the number, length, and rating of chosen bridges predicted by
the model with those observed in the data. For example, the counties in the first tertile of
budget shares choose on average of 2.78 bridges in the data, whereas the model predicts
about 2.48 bridges. The overall fit is reasonably close for the number and length of chosen
bridges. However, the model tends to over-predict the inclusion of deteriorated bridges
as the average rating of chosen bridges predicted by the model tends to be lower.28
Table 10: Parameter Estimates for Bridge Costs
Variable Estimate S.E.
Constant term 4.4908 0.2061
Structure length 0.6185 0.1044
Structure length2 -0.0378 0.0067
I(sufficiency rating = L ) 0.1521 0.0710
I(sufficiency rating = M ) 0.2441 0.0687
I(number of lanes under the structure = H) 0.5941 0.2414
Area -0.0401 0.0100
Area2 0.0002 0.00004
I(functional classification = rural or other principal arterial ) 0.1223 0.0675
I(number of lanes on the structure = H) -1.0548 0.3293
I(number of spans in main unit = H) 0.9196 0.3200
Length of maximum span 0.1222 0.0485
I(curb width = H ) -0.5026 0.1536
Deck width 0.1588 0.3366
Deck width2 0.4005 0.1393
I(historically significant) -0.1750 0.1307
R squared 0.5357
28In simulations, the budget is not exhausted as non-divisibility is ignored. Around $30.7 million is not
spent out of $290 million allocated to matched bridges in 55 counties. The average bridge replacement
cost in the data is about $440,000, so this equals to an amount for replacing around 70 local bridges.
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Table 11: Fit for Bridge Costs (Unit: $1,000)
Data Model No. of Obs.
Closed bridges 392.86 382.96 22
Restricted bridges 371.52 352.18 400
Bridges with a sufficiency rating less than 20 393.90 363.92 75
Bridges with a sufficiency rating between 20 and 40 383.14 354.77 241
Bridges with a sufficiency rating between 40 and 60 407.46 378.86 132
Bridges with a sufficiency rating between 60 and 80 406.32 368.99 106
Bridges with a sufficiency rating between 80 and 100 456.56 390.42 74
Lastly, estimated parameters for the bridge cost are reported in Table 10. To impute
costs for bridges that are not included in the bill, I use OLS to estimate bridge costs using
bridges that were authorized by the bill. Various technical bridge features from the NBI
data are used in the estimation and I report the fit in Table 11.
9 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, I describe the results of counterfactual experiments designed to compare
allocation outcomes in different scenarios. In the first counterfactual experiment, I sim-
ulate the budgetary allocation that would arise if universalism were to break down and
a minimum winning coalition were formed in the Legislative Bargaining Game for the
BBCB of 1992. That is, a proposer who is randomly chosen according to the estimated
recognition probability makes an allocation offer to a coalition consisting of cheapest mem-
bers to secure a majority’s consent. The model suggests that payoffs under universalism
are equal to the expected payoffs from the Legislative Bargaining Game. When simulated
payoffs from the Legislative Bargaining Game are averaged out sufficiently many times,
they are indeed almost the same as the payoffs under universalism.
However, the distribution of benefits realized in the Legislative Bargaining Game is
38
very different from that in universalism. In Table 12, I compare the standard deviation of
budgetary shares in the Legislative Bargaining game and that in universalism. As exactly
N+1
2 members in the minimum winning coalition receive positive money shares in the
Legislative Bargaining Game, the distribution of benefits is highly concentrated. Among
all members, the standard deviation is 1.69 in universalism, whereas it is 10.47 in the
Legislative Bargaining Game. Furthermore, the distribution is also quite concentrated
within the minimum winning coalition. Among N+12 members in the minimum winning
coalition, the standard deviation of budget shares is 14.66. This is because the proposer
extracts as much as possible from the coalition partners. On average, the proposer takes
about 85.92 percent of the budget, whereas the shares of the coalition partners range
from 0.07 percent to 0.90 percent of the budget. The largest share for a member equals
to 10.01 percent of the budget in universalism.
Table 12: Comparison of Budgetary Allocation Distribution
Standard Dev.
Universalism Among N members 1.69
Legislative Bargaining Game Among N members 10.47
Among N+12 members 14.66
in the minimum winning coalition
The same budget M¯ is exogenously given in the counterfactual experiment as in the
baseline model. However, the size of a budget can also be closely associated with a voting
outcome. For example, if a budget is not large enough to be shared, legislators may
be less likely to cooperate universally. To investigate this relationship, I analyze all 62
distributive bills on capital projects passed by the Pennsylvania State Legislature from
1981 to 2014. The size of a budget varies greatly as 10 bills allocated $0.168 billion on
average for less than 5 items and the remaining bills allocated $2.85 billion on average for
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a long list of items. Unanimous agreement is more frequently found in bills with larger
budgets, although the difference is not quite significant.29 The number of observations is
small to generalize its finding, but the evidence suggests that the size of a winning coalition
can differ as the size of a budget changes. With this caveat in mind, the counterfactual
experiment should be interpreted as an exercise comparing the dispersion of benefits when
the same budget is being allocated by a bare majority rather than by everyone.
Next, I conduct a counterfactual experiment to analyze the political impact on the
allocations determined under universalism. In the model, more money may be diverted
to districts with better political representation in the legislature, all other things being
equal. Also, given the budgetary allocation, political returns may affect the choice of
projects for grants within each district. To assess the extent to which political factors
influence the budgetary allocation, I first simulate the budgetary allocation that would
arise if all political channels in the legislature were shut down. That is, I let the recognition
probabilities to only depend on actual needs by setting α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.
The results are reported in Tables 13 and 14. Compared to the baseline simulation
of the model, I find that 16.73 percent of the aggregate budget, or equivalently $62.07
million, would be allocated differently. For example, the share for counties with no Senate
committee membership increases by 24.97 percent, as shown in Table 13. The shares for
counties with committee memberships would all decrease, although the extent of the
decrease differs depending on committee. The percentage drop for the share of counties
with a committee chair in either chamber is large as well. In Table 14, I look at the
2950 percent of the House and 70 percent of the Senate agreed unanimously for the former small budget
bills. For the remaining bills, 65 percent of the House and 88 percent of the Senate agreed unanimously.
As universalism is pervasive, all of these bills received either unanimous or much larger than a bare
majority support.
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Table 13: Change in Budgetary Share by Committee (Unit: Percent)
Baseline No Political No. of Change
Channels Counties
No Senate committee 26.55 33.18 26 24.97% ⇑
Senate committee chair 39.05 29.83 16 23.61% ⇓
Senate Rules & Executive Nom. 46.86 36.06 19 23.05% ⇓
Senate Transportation 47.01 39.61 26 15.74% ⇓
Senate Appropriation 66.67 59.83 38 10.26% ⇓
House committee chair 24.76 15.62 7 36.91% ⇓
No House committee 21.77 26.49 23 21.68% ⇑
House Rules & Executive Nom. 43.06 34.82 18 19.14% ⇓
House Appropriation 60.90 50.23 26 17.52% ⇓
House Transportation 43.58 37.32 22 14.36% ⇓
No Senate nor House committee 3.93 7.47 7 90.08% ⇑
Table 14: Change in Budgetary Share by Representation in the Chambers (Unit: Percent)
No. of Senators One Two Three
or More
Baseline 39.28 25.14 35.58
No political channels 52.04 25.97 21.98
No. of counties 40 15 12
Change 32.48% ⇑ 3.30% ⇑ 38.22% ⇓
No. of House Members One Two Three Four Five
or More
Baseline 11.65 9.17 16.33 15.95 46.90
No political channels 17.93 14.30 18.99 15.96 32.82
No. of counties 18 11 14 7 17
Change 53.91% ⇑ 55.94% ⇑ 16.29% ⇑ 0.06% ⇑ 30.02% ⇓
percentage change in budget shares by representation in the chambers. In both chambers,
the lowermost and uppermost counties in terms of the number of included legislators would
face large changes in their values. The analysis shows that having political power in the
legislature translates into considerable additional budgetary gains.
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Given the simulated shares of money, I now simulate the portfolio allocation which
would arise if bridges only differed in their technical attributes by setting β4 = β5 = 0.
The selected portfolios change for two reasons. First, the number of bridges granted
funds in each county becomes different as budget shares change. Second, which bridges
are chosen also becomes different as they are ranked differently. The extent of the first
effect was analyzed previously using the percentage change of budget shares, so here I
present the extent of the second effect. For each county in a simulation, I calculate the
net benefit of bridges given the estimated parameters and again with β4 = β5 = 0, added
by common simulated shocks. Then I sort these two vectors of net benefits in order
to compare how many bridges are ranked differently. Table 15 summarizes the average
proportion of bridges whose ranking becomes different when political factors are shut
down. I find that the impact is quite heterogeneous across counties. For instance, less
than 10 percent of bridges are ranked differently for 35 counties. On the other hand,
some counties such as Allegheny have as many as 47 percent of its bridges being ranked
differently.
Table 15: Change in Ranking of Bridges
Proportion of Bridges with Different Ranking No. of Counties
less than 10% 35
between 10% and 20% 5
between 20% and 30% 8
between 30% and 40% 5
between 40% and 50% 2
The structural approach taken by this model is essential for conducting the two coun-
terfactual experiments. In the first counterfactual analysis, suppose one wants to compare
allocations from universalism and those from the Legislative Bargaining Game without
structurally estimating the model. As an alternative, one can collect bills passed with
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unanimous or bare majority support and make an inference by comparing the average
distribution of benefits. Although this analysis gives a general idea, it may not give a
reasonable prediction for the counterfactual outcome of this bill that we are interested in.
As the underlying bargaining power can differ greatly across bills, concentration of bene-
fits will be different as well.30 To analyze counterfactual outcome of this bill, one would
first need to structurally estimate the model to recover the underlying power structure.
The structural approach is also necessary for the second counterfactual experiment.
As an alternative, suppose one uses a reduced-form analysis to predict allocations without
political channels. For instance, one can first regress money shares m on the observable
features ~Y and estimate coefficients. Using these coefficients and shutting down the
political feature variables, one can simulate money shares. However, this does not answer
the question of our interest as the simulated shares do not add up to the aggregate budget.
To analyze how the aggregate budget would be allocated differently without the political
channels, one would need to structurally estimate the model.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, I present a novel way of modeling universalism in a game-theoretic frame-
work, where a legislature allocates a given budget for a distributive omnibus bill under
unanimous consent. One of the contributions of this paper is that I combine the in-
sights from the previous literature on universalism with the non-cooperative bargaining
30For instance, Appendix A.4. shows that the estimated parameters from the BBCB in 1992 can
reasonably predict the allocation results for the BBCB in 1994, but not so well for the BBCB in 1999.
This suggests that the bargaining power can change even among the same set of bills, depending on
various circumstances.
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literature. The model is general and flexible enough to be empirically applied to any
distributive omnibus bill passed with unanimous consent. Using a constructed data set,
I structurally estimate the model to rationalize how the Pennsylvania General Assembly
allocated funds to deteriorated local bridges in the BBCB in 1992. I find that the distri-
bution of benefits determined by universalism is much more dispersed compared to that
generated by a non-cooperative bargaining game. Also, I find that political factors affect
the geographical outlay of the budget as well as the choice of bridges granted funds under
universalism.
There are several extensions of this paper which can be addressed in the future. First,
my focus has been on a static game, but cooperation may be dynamically sustained over
time. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to model and struc-
turally estimate how heterogeneous allocations are determined under unanimous agree-
ment. Therefore, a static framework seems to be an appropriate first step, but includ-
ing dynamics would be interesting for future’s work.31 Second, currently I focus on a
typical local public good defined in the public economics literature, where benefits are
locally concentrated with diffused costs. However, one could also consider a public project
with externalities, in which case there would be coordination across members in selecting
projects. Lastly, this paper analyzes the case when there is a unanimous agreement. How-
31For simplicity, one can think of modeling universalism in a dynamic setting as the following. Consider
an overlapping generation of finitely lived politicians in a deterministic environment. For cooperation to
not unravel, politicians in their last term would have to be ensured sufficient budget shares. Politicians
remaining in the legislature would cooperate, knowing that they would also be ensured sufficient shares
in their last term. However, in reality where the turnover rate is quite high and politicians exit the legis-
lature for many unexpected reasons, it is not clear whether such universal cooperation can be sustained.
Moreover, distributive bills with a room for everyone to benefit are often introduced irregularly. Given
such high uncertainty, focusing on present may be what is relevant for politicians in the legislature.
44
ever, over-sized coalitions approaching unanimity can also arise in reality and it would be
interesting to allow for different coalitions sizes in the equilibrium.
A Appendix
A.1 Solution Method of the Budgetary Allocation
Eraslan (2002) proved that when δj = δ ∀j, then ρj ≤ ρk implies vj ≤ vk. I use this
theoretical result to solve the equilibrium object (r, v). For simplicity, I explain the case
when N = 5. This can be extended to any N greater than five. Given recognition
probabilities of all members and a common discount factor, I enumerate the subscripts of
members by their ordering of recognition probabilities for notational simplicity.
ρ1 ≤ ρ2 ≤ ρ3 ≤ ρ4 ≤ ρ5.(16)
Given the theoretical result, the following relationship holds:
v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v3 ≤ v4 ≤ v5.(17)
However, note that the equality sign can not be eliminated as the theoretical result only
gives weak monotonicity. First, I guess that there is only a single way to form a minimum
winning coalition as the following:
v1 < v2 < v3 < v4 < v5.(18)
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Given this relationship, each member has exactly one way of forming a minimum winning
coalition. This determines the r matrix, which can be denoted as the following:
r =
( 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
)
,(19)
where rjk refers to the probability that member k is a coalition partner of member j.
Using this r, I compute the fixed point for v using equation (2). Then I check whether r
is indeed consistent given v. If it is consistent, I found the equilibrium; otherwise, I now
search for mixed strategies.
A mixed strategy equilibrium involves the case when there are multiple ways of forming
a minimum winning coalition. For example, suppose I guess the following:
v1 < v2 = v3 < v4 < v5.(20)
Members 1, 2, and 3 have one unique way of forming a minimum winning coalition as
before. However, members 4 and 5 have two different ways of forming a minimum winning
coalition since the cost of including either member 2 or member 3 is the same. This implies
that the r matrix can be written as:
r =
 0 1 1 0 01 0 1 0 01 1 0 0 0
1 a4 b4 0 0
1 a5 b5 0 0
 ,(21)
where a4 + b4 = a5 + b5 = 1. I discretize the grids for these a-s and b-s and iterate to find
(r, v) that satisfies the equilibrium condition.
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Some inequality relationships are redundant, such as:
v1 < v2 = v3 < v4 < v5,(22)
v1 < v2 = v3 < v4 = v5.(23)
Excluding a pure strategy case, there are N2 + 2N cases to consider when there are N
members.
A.2 An Alternative Model of Portfolio Allocation
Consider an alternative way of modeling the portfolio allocation as an optimization prob-
lem solved over sets. Suppose member j has K projects and the budget is given by m∗j .
The objective of member j is to choose a portfolio of projects to maximize his or her
utility given the budget constraint.
maxU(Bl),(24)
s.t.
K∑
h
ph · I(h ∈ Bl) ≤ m∗j .(25)
Bl is a portfolio of projects and its utility can be written as:
U(Bl) = X¯lβ + l.(26)
X¯l is a vector containing average characteristics of projects in Bl. l is unobserved to the
econometrician but known to member j. It is assumed to be iid type I extreme value with
47
scale parameter σ. If B1 is chosen among W feasible sets, the probability is written as:
Pr(portfolio|X¯; β, σ) =
exp( X¯1β
σ
)
ΣWk=1exp( X¯kβσ )
.(27)
Similarly, the parameters of the model can be estimated by maximizing the likelihood.
L =
N∏
j=1
Pr(portfolioj|X¯; β, σ).(28)
One issue with this framework is that the number of possible sets grows exponentially
as the budget or total number of project stock increases. Some feasible sets can be ruled
out by concentrating on those sets that exhaust the budget sufficiently. Although feasible
sets need to be calculated once, the calculation turns out to be infeasible with a large
number of sets. Moreover, this also implies that the probability of choosing a portfolio
will become almost zero. For instance, Allegheny county has 372 local bridges. In the
data, I observe that 21 bridges were chosen. Simply calculating all possible combinations
of choosing 21 out of 372 projects already exceeds a number which has about 35 digits.
Although many sets would be dropped which either exceed or do not exhaust budget
sufficiently, the number of possible combinations is still very big.
A.3 Estimation using Senate Districts
Instead of combining information from two chambers at the county level, I now use actual
Senate districts to estimate the model. Theoretically, one can also use districts for the
House of Representatives. However, there are 203 districts for the House of Representa-
tives in Pennsylvania and this makes the computation to be quite intensive. I match all
6,232 local bridges to 50 Senate districts by tracking their location at the township, bor-
48
ough, city, or ward level. The recognition probability now only contains characteristics of
the Senate districts and political features of senators. The parameter estimates are shown
in Table 16. As less information is available at the Senate district level and political fea-
tures are now defined for each single senator, the specification is a bit different from that
in Table 4. Out of 8 variables, 4 of them are statistically significant at 1 percent, and each
one variable is statistically significant at 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. Similar
to the estimation results for the baseline model, features related to needs and political
representation have positive coefficients which are associated with a higher recognition
probability.
Table 16: Parameter Estimates Using Senate Districts
Variable Estimate S.E.
α1 I(No representation in relevant committees) -0.0488 0.3747
α2 Square root of number of Senate terms served 0.6362 0.4948
α3 Log of number of bridges 1.7148 0.0734
α4 I(No historically significant bridges) -0.7675 0.4569
α5 Square root of number of cities 0.8131 0.3227
σξ Scale parameter for the ξ distribution 1.5553 0.0103
δ Discount factor 0.7838 0.0553
ση Standard deviation for the η distribution 0.0141 0.0013
Log likelihood 143.22
Next, I show the model fit in Tables 17 and 18. Overall, the model fits the data
reasonably well, although the fit is not as good as the baseline model which combines
information from the two chambers. For instance, the model tends to over-predict money
shares for districts with low population density. Each Senate district has a population of
around 237,000 and some districts cover quite large geographical areas that are sparsely
populated. The number of bridges can be quite big in a large Senate district. However,
this corresponding area is mapped to relatively fewer House districts. Therefore, the
shares tend to be over-predicted when the House information is not accounted for. The
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estimation results based on the Senate information gives a reasonable fit for the budgetary
allocation outcome, but at the same time suggests that incorporating features from both
chambers improves the model’s prediction.
Table 17: Fit of the Budget Shares by Committees (Unit: Percent)
Budget Share of Districts with Membership in: Data Model No. of Districts
Senate Transportation 20.44 24.33 10
Senate Appropriations 33.28 42.11 20
Senate Rules & Executive Nominations 17.31 24.74 15
No Senate committee 42.83 53.21 23
Table 18: Fit of the Budget Shares by Needs (Unit: Percent)
Quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
No. of local bridges Data 2.80 20.06 20.65 20.20 36.29
Model 5.91 18.06 16.31 22.88 36.84
No. of closed bridges Data 24.63 7.26 14.91 25.91 27.55
Model 21.92 10.44 16.44 28.36 22.84
No. of restricted bridges Data 4.75 17.04 20.37 19.50 38.33
Model 8.33 14.13 18.24 18.07 41.23
A.4 Simulation using BBCB from Other Years
To investigate the extent to which the estimation results can be generalized to other bills,
I simulate the model using the estimated parameters in Table 4 and the two subsequent
BBCB bills passed after 1992. The BBCB in 1994 and 1999 allocated around $223 mil-
lion to 324 local bridges and $1.35 billion to 1,071 local bridges respectively. Variables
capturing political power in the legislature and bridge stock features are different and I
incorporate their status in ~Y of the recognition probability.
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Table 19: Fit of the Budget Shares by Committees (Unit: Percent)
1994 1999
Budget Share of Counties with Membership in: Data Model Data Model
Senate Transportation 73.62 65.73 75.34 61.68
Senate Appropriations 73.26 65.81 94.51 79.02
Senate Rules & Executive Nominations 66.59 61.93 90.85 72.85
No Senate committee 12.29 19.77 1.72 8.33
House Transportation 53.20 49.51 67.90 50.45
House Appropriations 63.84 61.34 84.12 58.29
House Rules & Executive Nominations 29.05 44.52 82.38 58.65
No House committee 27.37 19.19 7.83 17.21
No Senate nor House committee 7.51 5.78 0.74 3.21
Table 20: Fit of the Budget Shares by Representation in the Chambers (Unit: Percent)
No. of Senators One Two Three or More
1994 Data 21.53 13.00 64.40Model 32.82 16.74 48.70
1999 Data 9.22 16.60 74.08Model 31.89 23.59 43.19
No. of House Members One Two Three Four Five or More
1994 Data 8.10 14.77 6.67 3.94 66.53Model 10.40 8.54 9.49 10.67 60.90
1999 Data 6.50 3.09 3.58 2.53 84.30Model 10.91 6.36 10.12 13.05 59.65
Tables 19 and 20 show the model fit when the budgetary allocations for the BBCB
in 1994 and 1999 are simulated. Overall, parameter estimates from the 1992 bill predict
the allocations in 1994 reasonably well. The model captures the trend and level given
committee membership and number of legislators. The fit is less accurate for the BBCB
of 1999. The distribution of benefits is much more concentrated for the bill in 1999
compared to the bills in 1992 and 1994. For instance, Allegheny took around 51.51 percent
of the aggregate budget in 1999. Without incorporating additional political features or
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changing the recognition probability parameters, the simulated model does not match the
distribution of benefits well. Therefore, one should be cautious about generalizing the
parameter estimates as the underlying bargaining power can greatly differ across bills.
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